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  1.  "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good, " with Laura Doval, forthcoming at Theoretical Economics

  2. "Purchase history and product personalization," with Laura Doval, forthcoming at RAND

  3. "Informed Information Design,"  with Frederic Koessler, forthcoming at Journal of Political Economy (previous version, "Information Design by an Informed Designer"). 

  4. "Constrained Information Design: Toolkit," with Laura Doval, forthcoming at Mathematics of Operations Research

  5. Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," with Laura Doval, Econometrica, 90, (4), July 2022, Pages 1463-1500supplement

  6. Test Design under Falsification," November 2021 with Eduardo Perez-Richet, Econometrica 90 (3), May 2022, Pages 1109-1142, online appendix 

  7. Incentive-driven Inattention,” with Raffaella Giacomini, Joao Issler and Wagner Piazza,  Journal of Econometrics, 231,(1), November 2022, Pages 188-212.

  8. Immunity” with Karthik Reddy and Moritz Schularick,   International Economic Review, Volume 61, Issue2, May 2020, Pages 531-56.   See also see  The Economist.

  9. Heterogeneity, Inattention and Bayesian Updates,” with Raffaella Giacomini and Javier Turen,  AEJ, MacroVOL. 12, NO. 1, JANUARY 2020, Pages 282-309. AEA highlight.

  10. Selling with Evidence,"  with Frederic Koessler, Theoretical Economics, 14 (2), Pages 345-371.

  11. “Selling through Referrals” with Daniele Condoreli and Andrea Galeotti, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 27 (4), Pages 669-685. 

  12. Informed Seller with Taste Heterogeneity,” with Frederic Koessler, Journal of Economic Theory,  Volume  165 (2016) Pages 456–471.

  13. Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment,” Journal of Economic TheoryVolume 159, Part B, September 2015, Pages 854–890

  14. Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission,” with Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Andrea Wilson,  Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 151, May 2014, Pages 304–341.

  15. Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection,” with Thomas Philippon,  lead article,  American Economic Review, 2012, 102(1):  Pages 1–30, older version.

  16. Asymmetric Partnerships,”  with Nicolás Figueroa, Economics LettersVolume 115, Issue 2, May 2012, Pages 268–271.

  17. Optimal Allocation Mechanisms with Single-Dimensional Private Information,” with Nicolás Figueroa, Review of Economic Design, 2011, Volume 15, Issue 3, Pages 213-243.

  18. On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure,” lead article, Review of Economic Designdetails of the examples

  19. Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation” with Laura Veldkamp,  Journal of Monetary Economics,  July 2009, v.56(5), Pages 678-695.  2009 Glucksman Institute Research Prize  

  20. A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms,” with Nicolás Figueroa, Economics Letters,   Volume 102, Issue 3, March 2009, Pages 169-173 

  21. The Role of Optimal Threats in Auction Design,” with Nicolás Figueroa,  Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 144, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 884-897

  22. Mechanism Design for Arbitrary Type Spaces,” Economics Letters, 91, (2006) Pages 293-299

  23.  “Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, Issue 4, Pages 1085-1111, October 2006. NAJ Review     technical appendixextensions

Book Chapters

  1. “Privatizations: Auction and Market design during a Crisis,"  in  "Beyond Austerity" MIT Press, edited by Costas Meghir, Christopher Pissarides, Dimitri Vayanos, Nikos Vettas.

  2. Did Asset Complexity Trigger Ratings Bias?” with Laura Veldkamp, NYU, Stern School of Business in Kolb, Robert W. (ed.), Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future, forthcoming from Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010.

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